Decentralized optimization of distributed stochastic differential systems has been an active area of research for over half a century. Its formulation utilizing static team and person-by-person optimality criteria is well investigated. However, the results have not been generalized to nonlinear distributed stochastic differential systems possibly due to technical difficulties inherent with decentralized decision strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last 50 years many mathematical concepts and procedures were developed to design optimal control strategies for stochastic dynamical systems. We refer to this set of mathematical concepts and procedures as the "classical theory of stochastic optimization". It has been utilized extensively to address the questions of existence of optimal strategies, and necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for systems driven by continuous martingale processes (Brownian motion processes), and discontinuous martingale processes (jump processes). It has been successfully applied to centralized fully observable control problems, meaning the admissible strategies are functions of a common noiseless measurements of the system [1] - [9] , and to centralized partially observable control systems, meaning the admissible strategies are functions of common noisy measurements of the system [2] , [10] - [13] . In addition, optimility conditions are derived for infinite dimensional systems and impulsive systems in [4] , [9] , [14] . Thus, the classical theory of optimization is developed on the assumption of centralized decisions or control actions. It presupposes that all information about the system can be acquired and accordingly the decision policies (control actions) can be formulated. The basic underlying assumption is that the acquisition of the information is centralized or the information acquired at different locations is communicated to each decision maker or control.
When the system model consists of multiple decision makers, and the acquisition of information and its processing is decentralized or shared among several locations, the decision makers actions are based on different information. We call the information available for such decisions, "decentralized information structures or patterns". When the system model is dynamic, consisting of an interconnection of at least two subsystems, and the decisions are based on decentralized information structures, we call the overall system a "distributed system with decentralized information structures". Over the years several specific forms of decentralized information structures are analyzed mostly in discrete-time [15] - [26] , and more recently [27] - [32] . However, at this stage there is no systematic framework addressing optimality conditions for distributed systems with decentralized information structures. The absence of such optimization theory raises the question whether the classical theory of optimization is limited in mathematical concepts and procedures to deal with decentralized systems. In this first part of the two-part investigation, we show that the classical theory of optimization
does not have such a limitation. We consider a team game reward [23] , [26] , [33] - [35] and we apply concepts from the classical theory of optimization to derive necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for nonlinear stochastic distributed systems with decentralized information structures. Our methodology utilizes the semi martingale representation theorem and variational methods recently reported by the authors in [36] .
The optimality conditions developed in this paper can be applied to many architectures of distributed systems such as Fig. 1 (see also [37] ). Each decision maker makes its decision based on local information and exerts control action that affects the overall distributed system, without allowing communication between the local decision makers. Such systems are called distributed systems with decentralized information structures. The team formulation of the distributed system with decentralized information structures, consists of an interconnection of N subsystems. Each subsystem i has its state denoted by x i ∈ X i , a local decision maker or control input u i ∈ A i , an exogenous Brownian motion noise input W i ∈ W i , and a coupling from the other subsystem.
Decentralized Information Structures for Decision Makers
The information structures of the local decision makers u i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N are defined as follows. For any t ∈ [0, T ], the information structure available to decision maker (DM) u i is modeled by the σ−algebra G Then the overall system can be expressed in compact form by the following stochastic Itô differential equation dx(t) = f (t, x(t), u t )dt + σ(t, x t , u t )dW (t), x(0) = x 0 , t ∈ (0, T ].
(1)
Team Game Pay-off Functional
The objective is to find a team optimal strategy
the pay-off functional defined by
ℓ(t, x(t), u(t))dt + ϕ(x(T ))
attains its minimum.
We consider two main classes of decentralized noiseless information structures; 1) nonanticipative functionals of any subset of the sybsystems Brownian motions {W 1 , . . . , W N }, called "nonanticipative information structures", and 2) nonanticipative functionals of any subset of the subsystem states {x 1 , . . . , x N }, called "feedback information structures" (see Section II-C).
Team Game Optimality Conditions
In Section V we derive team optimality conditions (Theorem 9) for pay-off (2) subject to (1) , under a strong formulation of the filtered probability space Ω, F, {F 0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}, P . These are summarized below.
Define the Hamiltonian
, consider the adjoint process {ψ, Q} and the state x satisfying the following backward and forward stochastic differential equations respectively, dψ(t) = −H x (t, x(t), ψ(t), Q(t), u t )dt + Q(t)dW (t), ψ(T ) = ϕ x (x(T )), t ∈ [0, T ), (4) dx(t) = H ψ (t, x(t), ψ(t), Q(t), u t )dt + σ(t, x(t), u t )dW (t),
The stochastic optimality conditions of the team game with decentralized noiseless information structures are given below.
(1) Necessary Conditions. Under certain conditions, which are precisely those of the classical theory of optimization, the following hold.
with the corresponding solution x o to be team optimal, it is necessary that the following hold:
The process {ψ o , Q o } is the unique solution of the backward stochastic differential equation (4) corresponding to the pair {u o , x o } and that they together satisfy the point wise almost sure inequalities with respect to the σ-algebras
(2) Sufficient Conditions. Under global convexity of the Hamiltonian with respect to the state and control variables and convexity of the terminal pay-off function ϕ(·) the pair
An important feature obtained during the derivation is that the optimality conditions for a team optimal strategy are equivalent to the optimality conditions for a person-by-person optimal strategy. This follows from Theorem 6 and Corollary 1.
The point to be made regarding the derivation of the above optimality conditions, is that we convert the problem into a centralized problem with the associated Hamiltonian system of equations to capture the constraints, and only at the final step, the optimality of decentralized strategies is addressed, by identifying the conditional variational Hamiltonian which is consistent with the decentralized information structures. That is, the Hamiltonian system (4), (5) is the one corresponding to centralized strategies, while the conditional Hamiltonian (6) is the projection of the centralized Hamiltonian onto the subspace generated by the decentralized information structures.
We conclude the preliminary discussion on classical optimization theory of centralized strategies versus decentralized strategies, by stating that there are no limitations in applying classical theory of optimization to distributed systems with decentralized information structures. Rather, the challenge is in the computation of the conditional Hamiltonians, and hence the optimal strategies. However, this has also remained a challenge for centralized fully or partially observed strategies.
The specific objectives of this paper are the following.
(a) Derive team games necessary conditions of optimality (stochastic maximum principle)
for distributed stochastic differential systems with decentralized information structures. A detailed investigation of applications of the results of this part to specific linear and nonlinear distributed stochastic differential decision systems is discussed in the second part of this two-part paper [38] where we derive the explicit expressions for the optimal decentralized strategies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we formulate the distributed stochastic differential system with decentralized information structures. In Section III, we consider the question of existence of optimal relaxed controls (decisions). In Section IV, we develop the stochastic optimality conditions for team games with decentralized information structures, consisting of necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality. In Section V, we specialize the necessary and sufficient optimality conditions to regular strategies and obtain corresponding February 15, 2013 DRAFT necessary and sufficient optimality conditions. The paper is concluded with some comments on possible extensions of our results.
II. TEAM GAMES OF STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL SYSTEMS
In this section we introduce the mathematical formulation of distributed stochastic systems, the information structures available to the decision makers for their actions, and the definitions of collaborative decisions via team game optimality and person-by-person optimality. Throughout the terms "decision maker" or "control" are used interchangeably. A stochastic dynamical decision or control system is called distributed if it consists of an interconnection of at least two subsystems and decision makers. The underlying assumption for these distributed systems is that the decision makers actions are based on decentralized information structures. However, the decision makers are allowed to exchange information on their law or strategy deployed, e.g., the functional form of their strategies but not their actions.
Some Basic Terminologies

DM
Abbreviation for "Decision Maker" Let Ω, F, {F 0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}, P denote a complete filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions [39] , that is, (Ω, F, P) is complete, F 0,0 contains all P-null sets in F. Note that
and it is called left continuous if
Throughout the paper filtrations are denoted by F T △ = {F 0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}, and they are assumed to be right continuous and complete.
Consider a random process {z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} defined on the filtered probability space
where B(Z) denotes the Borel algebra of subsets of Z. The process {z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is said to be
which is measurable and adapted has a progressively measurable modification [39] . Unless otherwise specified, we shall say a process {z(t) :
In our derivations we make extensive use of the following spaces considered by the authors in [36] 
A. Regular Strategies
In this subsection we consider measurable vector valued functions, also known as regular strategies. We consider the strong formulation. Let Ω, F, {F 0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}, P denote a fixed complete filtered probability space on which are based all random processes considered in the paper. At this stage we do not specify how {F 0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} came about, but we require that Brownian motions are adapted to this filtration.
Admissible Decision Maker Strategies
The Decision Makers (DM) {u i : i ∈ Z N } take values in a closed convex subset of linear
The admissible set of regular strategies is defined by
, which are nonanticipative with respect to the information structures {G i 0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}, i = 1, 2, . . . , N. Hence, the information structure of each DM, G i T , is decentralized, and may be generated by local or global subsystem observables. Nonanticipative strategies are often utilized when deriving the minimum principle for centralized stochastic control or decision systems [8] .
Distributed Stochastic Systems
Given a fixed probability space Ω, F, {F 0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}, P , a distributed stochastic system consists of an interconnection of N subsystems. Each subsystem i has its own state space (S1)
an R m i -valued standard Brownian motion which models the exogenous state noise, adapted to F T , independent of x i (0).
Each subsystem is described by a finite dimensional system of coupled stochastic differential equations of Itô type as follows.
On the product space (
Then on the product space the distributed system is described in compact form by
where
the diffusion coefficients. Note that (9) is very general since no specific interconnection structure is assumed among the different subsystems.
Pay-off Functional
Consider the distributed system (9) with decentralized full information structures. Given a
, we define the reward or performance criterion by
denotes the integrand for the running cost functional and ϕ : R n −→ (−∞, ∞], the terminal cost function. Notice that the performance of the decentralized system is measured by a single pay-off functional. The interpretation is that there is a centralized layer where the quality of individual decision makers strategies are evaluated for a common goal. Therefore, the underlying assumption concerning the single pay-off instead of multiple pay-offs (one for each decision maker) is that the team objective can be met. For deterministic as well as stochastic systems, it is well known that if the set A i is not convex, there may not exist any optimal control. For this reason it is necessary to introduce relaxed strategies as discussed in the next subsection.
B. Relaxed Strategies
This paper will focus on relaxed strategies (also called randomized strategies) and later on specialize to regular strategies (measurable functions). Therefore, we introduce the formulation based on relaxed strategies (e.g. probability measures on the action space). 
Distributed Stochastic Systems
the space of regular probability measures. The DM strategies with different information structures on the time interval [0, T ] will be described through the topological dual of the Banach space L
For convenience notation we denote this by
and the team strategies by the product space
Thus, for any i ∈ Z N , given the information
Clearly, for each i ∈ Z N and for every ϕ ∈ C(A i ) the process
, the distributed system is written in compact form as
where the drift and diffusion coefficient is now defined by
for F = {f, σ},
Pay-off Functional
Given a u ∈ U (N )
where ℓ and ϕ are as defined before.
C. Team and Person-by-Person Optimality
In this section we give the precise definitions of team and person-by-person (i.e., playerby-player) optimality for relaxed and regular strategies. There are many possible information structures for control strategies {u i : i ∈ Z N }. We consider the following. 
This is often called open loop information, and it is the one used in classical stochastic control with centralized full information to derive the maximum principe [8] .
(FIS): Feedback Information Structures. Decision u i is adapted to the filtration G
where the observables z i are nonanticipative measurable functionals of any combination of the states defined by
Note that the state x and hence the observables z i may depend on controls.
The set of admissible regular feedback strategies is defined by
Similarly, the set of admissible relaxed feedback strategies is defined by
One might be tempted to believe that nonanticipative strategies might be restrictive, because they are not explicitly described in terms of feedback. We will show that this is not true. In fact such strategies cover a large number of interesting problems.
Problem 1. (Team Optimality)
(RS): Relaxed Strategies. Given the pay-off functional (14) , constraint (12) the N tuple of (19) is called an optimal relaxed decision strategy (or control) and the corresponding (12) ) the optimal state process.
is called nonanticipative team optimal if it satisfies
Similarly, feedback team optimal strategies are defined with respect to
(NRS): Regular Strategies. Regular nonanticipative team optimal strategies are defined with respect to pay-off (10) , constraint (9) , and
By definition, Problem 1 is a dynamic team problem with each DM having a different information structure (decentralized). To the best of the authors knowledge there seems to have been no attempt in the literature to address the Problem 1. An alternative approach to handle such problems with decentralized information structures is to restrict the definition of optimality to the so-called person-by-person (player-by-player) equilibrium.
Problem 2. (Person-by-Person Optimality)
(RS): Relaxed Strategies. Given the pay-off functional (14) , constraint (12) the N tuple of
Similarly, feedback person-by-person optimal strategies are defined with respect to
(NRS): Regular Strategies. Regular nonanticipative person-by-person optimal strategies are defined with respect to pay-off (10) , constraint (9) , and
, while feedback personby-person optimal strategies are defined with respect to
The interpretation of (20) is that the variation and hence evaluation (of team optimality) is done by the central layer and it is this layer alone that can determine if the decision for the i-th player is optimal or not. Even for Problem 2 the authors of this paper are not aware of any publication which addresses necessary and/or sufficient conditions of optimality. Conditions (20) are analogous to the Nash equilibrium strategies of team games consisting of a single pay-off and N DM. The person-by-person optimal strategy states that none of the N members (possibly with different information structures) can deviate unilaterally from the optimal strategy and gain by doing so. The rationale for the restriction to person-by-person optimal strategy is based on the fact that the actions of the N DM are not communicated to each other, and hence they cannot do better than restricting attention to this optimal strategy. Problems 1, 2 using relaxed strategies are the main problems addressed in this paper, while conclusions for regular strategies are drawn from these results. Clearly, any strategy which is optimal for Problem 1 is also a person-by-person optimal and hence optimal for Problem 2.
III. EXISTENCE OF TEAM OPTIMAL STRATEGIES
As mentioned earlier, not every control problem admits optimal regular strategies. However, in many problems relaxed strategies exist under certain mild assumptions. In this section we use a similar procedure as the one developed in [36] for centralized information structures to prove (i) existence of solution of the distributed stochastic dynamical decision system (12) , and (ii) existence of optimal relaxed strategies for the Problem 1.
A generalized sequence u i,α ∈ U i rel [0, T ] is said to converge (in the weak * topology or) vaguely
With respect to the vague (weak * ) topology the set U i rel [0, T ] is compact, and from here on we assume that U i rel [0, T ], ∀i ∈ Z N has been endowed with this vague topology.
processes endowed with the norm topology · defined by
To study the question of existence of solution to (12) we use the following assumptions.
Assumptions 1.
The drift f and diffusion coefficients σ associated with (12) are defined by the Borel measurable maps:
and they are continuous in the last two arguments and assumed to satisfy the following basic properties:.
Assumptions 1, (A1)-(A4) are the so-called Itô conditions for existence and uniqueness of strong solutions (having continuous sample paths) [8] .
The following lemma proves the existence of solutions and their continuous dependence on the decision variables. System (12) has a unique solution
The solution of system (12) is continuously dependent on the control, in the sense that,
These statements also hold for feedback strategies
Proof: Since the class of policies
is also compact in this topology. Utilizing this observation the proof is identical to that of [36] , Lemma 3.1.
Using the results of Lemma 1 in the next theorem we establish existence of a minimizer
We need the following assumptions.
Assumptions 2.
The functions ℓ and ϕ associated with the pay-off (14) are Borel measurable maps:
satisfying the following basic conditions:
Now we present the following existence theorem [36] .
Theorem 1. (Existence of Team Optimal Strategies) Consider Problem 1 and suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then there exists a team decision
Proof: Since the class of control policies U N rel [0, T ] is compact in the vague topology, it suffices to prove that J(·) is lower semicontinuous with respect to this topology. This follows precisely from the same procedure as in [36] , Theorem 3.2.
We conclude this section by stating that existence of team optimal strategies utilizing decentralized information structures follows directly from analogous results of centralized stochastic control strategies [13] .
IV. OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS FOR RELAXED STRATEGIES
In this section we present the necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality for the team We need the following class of F T −semi martingales:
Now we present a fundamental result which is used in the derivation of minimum principle. given by
Proof: For proof see Theorem 4.3 in [36] .
For the derivation of stochastic minimum principle of optimality we shall require stronger regularity conditions for the drift and diffusion coefficients {b, σ}, as well as, for the running and terminal pay-offs functions {ℓ, ϕ}. These are given below. 
Consider the Gateaux derivative of σ with respect to the variable at the point (t, z, ν)
Note that the map η −→ σ x (t, z, ν; η) is linear, and it follows from Assumptions 3, (C3) that there exists a finite positive number β > 0 such that
In order to present the necessary conditions of optimality we need the so called variational 
) denote the solutions of the system equation (12) corresponding to u ε (·) and u o (·), respectively. Consider the limit
We have the following result characterizing the process {Z(t) : 
and it is the unique solution of the variational stochastic differential
having a continuous modification.
Proof: We closely follow the steps in [33] . Writing the system (12) as an integral equation
with solutions x ε , x o corresponding to controls u ε , u o respectively and taking the difference x ε (t) − x o (t) and dividing by ε and then letting ε −→ 0, it can be shown that it converges for all t ∈ [0, T ], P − a.s. to the solution of system (23) . Note that the system (23) is a linear stochastic differential equation in Z with non homogeneous terms given by the sum of the last two terms.
Let {z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} denote the solution of its homogenous part given by
By Assumptions 3 and Lemma 1 this system has a unique solution {z(t) : t ∈ [s, T ]} given by
where Ψ(t, s), t ∈ [s, T ] is the random (F T −adapted) transition operator for the homogenous system. Since the derivatives of f and σ with respect to the state are uniformly bounded, the transition operator Ψ(t, s), t ∈ [s, T ] is uniformly P−a.s. bounded (with values in the space of n × n matrices).
By Using the random transition operator Ψ we can write the solution of the non homogenous stochastic differential equation (23) as follows,
where {η(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is the semi martingale given by the following Ito differential,
Note that {η(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is a continuous square integrable F T −adapted semi martingale.
The fact that it has continuous modification follows directly from the representation (25) Under the (additional) Assumptions 4 we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Consider Problem 1 and suppose Assumptions 1 and 4 hold. Define the σ−algebras
Then for all u ∈ U (N ),x u rel [0, T ] the two σ-algebras are equivalent written as an equality, F
Proof: Clearly, by Lemma 1, we have F Under the conditions of Theorem 3, for any stochastic kernel {u
. . , Z N , and define all such adapted nonanticipative functions by
Next, we introduce the following additional assumptions.
Assumptions 5.
The following holds.
Under the additional Assumptions 5 we can prove the following result. 
Proof: The assertion is obvious because of the density assumption (E2) and the continuity of J in the vague topology.
The point to be made regarding Theorem 4 is that if u ∈ U (N ),x u rel [0, T ] achieves the infimum of J(u) then it is also optimal with respect to U (N ) (29) , (30) can be generalized to more than two coupled systems.
Next, we introduce the following alternative theorem to Theorem 4, which does not employ Assumptions 5. 
Proof: The derivation is based on [40] but extended to relaxed strategies. By Theorem 3,
, and any test function φ ∈ C(A (N ) ),
Clearly 
and
Therefore, u k,t is F
From the above equations it follows that (36) also holds for k ≤ t ≤ 2k, and by induction that F
Therefore, u i k,t is also (weak star) measurable with respect to F . Before we prove the optimality conditions we define the Hamiltonian system of equations.
The Hamiltonian is a real valued function
given by
For any u ∈ U (N )
satisfies the following backward stochastic differential equation
x is the derivative of σ (k) with respect to the state, for k = 1, 2, . . . , m, Q (k) is the kth column of Q).
In terms of the Hamiltonian, the state process satisfies the stochastic differential equation
A. Necessary Conditions of Optimality
In this section we state and prove the necessary conditions for team optimality. Specifically,
is team optimal, we show that it leads naturally to the Hamiltonian system of equations (called necessary conditions). The derivation is based on the semi martingale representation as in [36] with some modifications necessary to admit decentralized strategies adapted to an arbitrary filtration.
In the following theorem we present the necessary conditions of optimality for Problem 1.
Theorem 6. (Necessary conditions for team optimality) Consider Problem 1 under Assumptions 2, 3.
(I) Suppose F T = σ{x(0), W (t), t ∈ [0, T ]} and U (N ) rel [0, T ]
is the class of relaxed controls adapted to this filtration. For an element
u o ∈ U (N ) rel [0, T ] with the corresponding solution x o ∈ B ∞ F T ([0, T ], L 2 (Ω, R n )) to
be team optimal, it is necessary that the following conditions hold.
(1) There exists a semi martingale
is the unique solution of the backward stochastic differential equation (38) , (39) and that, for
(II) Suppose F T is as above, and the Assumption 5 holds. For an element
with the corresponding solution
be team optimal, it is necessary that the statements of Part (I) hold with
G i 0,t replaced by G z i,u 0,t , ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
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Proof: The derivation of (1), (2) follows closely the basic steps of centralized strategies in [36] , from which the derivation of team necessary conditions of optimality (3) are established.
(I). (1) Suppose
) denote the solutions of the system (12) and (41) corresponding to u ε (·)
Define the Gateaux differential of
Dividing the expression (44) by ε and letting ε ↓ 0 we obtain
where L(Z) is given by the functional
Since by Lemma 2, the process 
given by the expression (25) . Thus the
Then by virtue of Riesz representation theorem for Hilbert spaces, there exists a semi martingale
(2) Substituting (47) into (45) we obtain the following variational equation.
It follows from the definition of the Hamiltonian that the inequality (48) is precisely (42) along
This completes the proof of (2).
(3) Next, we prove that the pair
is given by the solution of the adjoint equations (38), (39) . Computing the Itô differential of the scalar product Z, ψ o and integrating this over [0, T ], it follows from the variational equation (23) that
where the last bracket < ·, · > in each of the above expressions is the quadratic variation between the two processes, and the stochastic integrals in (49) have zero expectation giving (50). Since Itô derivatives of the variation process {Z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} and the adjoint process {ψ
have the form
their quadratic variation is given by
The first term on the right hand side of the above expression is linear in Z, hence there exists
given by the following expression
By Assumptions 3, σ has uniformly bounded spatial first derivative and it follows from the semi
Substituting (54) into (53) and (53) into (50), we obtain
Thus, by setting
it follows from (55) and the expression for the functional L(·) given by (46) that
Substituting (58) into (45) we again obtain (42), as expected. This is precisely what was obtained by the semi martingale argument giving (47). Thus the pair
satisfy the backward stochastic differential equation (56), (57), which is precisely the adjoint equation given by (38) , (39) . Since ψ o satisfies the stochastic differential equation and T is finite, it follows from the classical theory of Itô differential equations that ψ o is actually an
In other words, ψ o is more regular than predicted by semi martingale theory. Hence, by our Assumptions on σ it is easy to verify that
This proves the first part of (3).
Now we show (43)
. Write (42) in terms of the Hamiltonian as follows.
where the triple {x o , ψ o , Q o } is the unique solution of the Hamiltonian system (38) , (39), (40), (41) . By using the property of conditional expectation then
Let t ∈ (0, T ), ω ∈ Ω and ε > 0, and consider the sets
For any sub-sigma algebra G ⊂ F, let P| G denote the restriction of the probability measure P on to the σ-algebra
Clearly, it follows from the above construction that
Substituting (61) in (60) we obtain the following inequality
Letting |I 
To complete the proof of (3) define
We shall show that
Suppose for some i ∈ Z N , (65) does not hold, and let The following remark helps identifying the martingale term in the adjoint process.
Remark 2. The arguments in the derivation of Theorem 6 involving the Riesz representation theorem for Hilbert space martingales, determine the martingale term of the adjoint process
, dual to the first martingale term in the variational equation (23) , provided ψ x (·) exists (i.e., f xx , σ xx , ℓ xx , ϕ xx exist and are uniformly bounded). Hence, Q in the adjoint equation (38) , is identified as Q(t) ≡ ψ x (t)σ(t, x(t), u t ). When the diffusion term σ(·, ·, ·) is independent of x, given by σ(t, u), then since V Q (t), ζ = tr(Q * (t)σ x (t, x, u t ; ζ)) we
, the spatial derivative of the diffusion term is zero).
It is interesting to note that the necessary conditions, for a
to be a person-by-person optimal policy, can be derived following similar steps as given in Theorem 6, and that these necessary conditions are the same as the necessary conditions for the team optimal strategy. This is stated as a Corollary.
Corollary 1. (Necessary conditions for person-by-person optimality) Consider Problem 2 under Assumptions 2, 3. Under the conditions of Theorem 6, Part (I), for an element
be a person-by-person optimal strategy, it is necessary that statements (1), (3) of Theorem 6, and Part I, with statement (2)
replaced by
hold. Similar conclusions hold for strategies U then by choosing all other u i = u i,o , ∀i ∈ Z N , i = j, the right side of (42) will be negative, which is a contradiction. This observation is new, and has not been documented in the static team game literature [23] .
Remark 3. From the above necessary conditions one can deduce the necessary conditions for
full centralized information and partial centralized information. We state these conditions below.
( 
} are the solutions of the Hamiltonian system (40) , (41), (38) , (39) . This corresponds to the classical case [8] . 
Moreover, if the strategies are based on centralized state feedback information, that is,
u i are adapted to the information G x u T , ∀i ∈ Z N ,
then under the conditions of Theorem 6, Part (II) the previous optimality conditions are replaced by
where K 0,t is a sub-sigma algebra of any of the sigma algebras indicated above.
Finally, we mention two important results derived in [36] which have direct extensions to the current paper. The first addresses existence of measurable relaxed team optimal strategy associated with the minimization of the Hamiltonian, and the second addresses existence of realizable relaxed strategies by regular strategies.
B. Sufficient Conditions of Optimality
In this section, we show that the necessary conditions of optimality (43) are also sufficient under certain convexity conditions. 
By the convexity of ϕ(·) then
Substituting (71) into (70) yields
Applying the Ito differential rule to ψ o , x − x o on the interval [0, T ] and then taking expecation we obtain the following equation.
Substituting (73) into (72) we obtain
Since by hypothesis H is convex in ξ ∈ R n and linear in ν ∈ M 1 (A (N ) ), H is convex in both
). Using this fact in (74) we readily obtain
where the last inequality follows from (43). This proves that u o optimal and hence the necessary conditions are also sufficient.
Under conditions similar to those of Theorem 7, we can verify that a strategy is person- 
Proof:
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 7.
V. OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS FOR REGULAR STRATEGIES
In the development of the necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality given in the previous section we have given conditions which assert the existence of optimal decisions from the class of relaxed decisions U (N )
The main observation of this section is that, if optimal regular decisions exist from the admissible
rel [0, T ] (or the feedback class) then the necessary and sufficient conditions of Theorem 6 and Theorem 7 can be specialized to the class of decision strategies which are simply Dirac measures concentrated {u
advantage of the theory of relaxed controls is that the necessary conditions of optimality for ordinary controls follow readily from those of relaxed controls without requiring differentiability of the Hamiltonian or equivalently the drift and the diffusion coefficients f, σ with respect to the control variables.
Thus we simply state the necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality for regular decentralized decision strategies which follow as a corollary of Theorem 6, 7 by simply specializing to regular decision strategies given by Dirac measures along the regular decision strategies leading to the following Hamiltonian
where 
The variational inequality is satisfied:
is a unique solution of the backward stochastic differential equation (38) , (39) Person-by-person optimality conditions for regular decision strategies follow from their relaxed counterparts, as discussed above. Therefore we simply state the results as a corollary. (38) , (39) is replaced by dψ(t) = − H x (t, x(t), ψ(t), Q(t), u t )dt + Q(t)dW (t) + dM(t), t ∈ [0, T ) (81) ψ(T ) =ϕ x (x(T )).
In view of the results obtained, we confirm that there are no limitations in applying classical theory of optimization to decentralized systems. Rather, the challenge is in the implementation of the new variational Hamiltonians and the computation the optimal strategies for specific examples. In Part II [38] of this two-part paper, we shall apply these optimality conditions to investigate various linear and nonlinear distributed stochastic team games and obtain closed form expressions for the optimal strategies for some of them.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have considered team games for distributed stochastic dynamical decision systems, with decentralized noiseless information patterns for each DM, under relaxed and deterministic strategies. Necessary and sufficient optimality conditions with respect to team optimality and person-by-person optimality criteria are derived, based on Stochastic Pontryagin's minimum principle, while we also discussed existence of the optimal strategies.
The methodology is very general, and applicable to many areas. However, several additional issues remain to be investigated. Below, we provide a short list.
(F1) For team games with regular strategies and non-convex action spaces A i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N, if the diffusion coefficients depend on the decision variables then it is necessary to derive optimality conditions based on second-order variations. The methodology presented to derive the necessary conditions of optimality can be easily extended to cover this case as well.
(F2) The derivation of optimality conditions can be used in other type of games such as Nash-equilibrium games with decentralized information structures for each DM, and minimax games.
(F3) The optimality conditions can be extended to distributed stochastic dynamical decision systems driven by both continuous Brownian motion processes and jump processes, such as Lévy or Poisson jump processes, by following the procedure of centralized strategies in [36] .
(F4) The optimality conditions can be applied to specific examples with decentralized noiseless information structures. Some of these are presented in the companion paper [38] .
(F5) The methodology can be extended to cover decentralized partial (noisy) information structures.
